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The question of rat~onality has been an important one for the
social ~ciences: ever since anthropological field studies revealed how
widely human societies differ from each other, there has been much
discussion on what should we think about this overwhelming
diversity of beliefs and values. Since it would probably be impossible
to make sense of a society whose practices were mostly irrati<?nal,
disjointed activities, when attempting to understand a culturally
distant form of life we assume it to be at least largely rational, that is,
we take the actors' beliefs, values, and goals to be in some kind of
intelligible relation to each other. This, of course, is one version of
the famous principle of charity. As Donald Davidson puts, it, the
method of interpretation aims "to make meaningful disagreement
possible, and this depends entirely on a foundation - some
foundation - in agreement".l In other words, without some kind of
basic agreement we could not locate the disagreements, and the
process of interpretation would halt before it even started; hence the
methodological inevitability of the principle of charity. Furthermore,
it is a striking feature of human existence that mediation between
very distant forms of life does regularly take place; or, as an
experienced observer remarks, "no anthropologist, to my knowledge,
has come back from a field trip with the following report: their
concepts are so alien that it is impossible to describe their land
tenure, their kinship system, their ritual".2
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However, the existence of radically differing belief systems, with
their correspondingly .differing ways. of reasoning and gathering
evidence, raise questions concerning cross-cultural Ussessments of
rationality. Should we merely content ourselves with making people's
actions as understandabJe as possible by. showing how they result
from their desires and beliefs, however bizarre and unreasonable
they appear to us? In other words, should we accept that each form of
life, our own included, has its own criteria of meaningfulness and
rationality, and no general account remains to be given? This would
amount to a relativistic conception of rationality that has been
motivated by, among other things, the praiseworthy ideals of
tolerance and open-mindedness: we should avoid ethnocentrism by
abstaining from imposing our own standards of rationality on other
(cultures. However, I suspect that although we, being aware of the
Western countries' colonialistic past, acknowledge the moral weight
of this idea, are in the end not ready to renounee the possibility of
criticism when Q€rtain beliefs or practices strike us as wildly
unjustified or harmful. In this paper, I examine some main
philosophical positions taken in the admittedly multifarious
discussion concerning the possibility of rational evaluation in
comparing different forms of life. Although the most heated debate
took place already some time ago, it is still true that,; as recent
commentators put it, "problems about what counts as good
reasoning are still there to be solved".3 In the end of this paper I shall
outline a view of rational evaluation that would be as sensitive as
possible to the diversity and offerings of various cultural viewpoints.
WINCH AND THE CONTEXT-DEPENDENCE OF
RATIONALITY
As is well known, Peter Winch's thought has its philosophical
moorings in Ludwig Wittgenstein's late philosophy. Winch's basic
contention is that all social action is meaningful, and that all
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meaningful action is necessarily rule-governed. Rule-governed
behavior is different in kind from phenomena obeying laws of nature,
and only in relation to the former can we talk about making mistakes,
about following or breaking a rule. Winch holds/that rules operate ~s
criteria of sameness, and hence without them we would be unable to
say when two things are to be regarded as the same. For example,
two physically distinct phenomena, let's say raising one's hand and
dropping a piece of paper to a ballot box, can both be interpreted as
the same thing, namely as voting, when they are seen to follow the
rules that constitute the social activity called "voting".4
Rules, in their turn, are anchored in a form of life, and must be
understood in its context. Although Winch does not deny that a
student of an alien society "may find it necessary to use concepts
which are not taken from the forms of activity he is investigating" but
from his own theoretical context, "still these theoretical concepts [...]
imply a previous understanding of those other concepts which belong
to the activities under investigation".5 This holds, for what is
meaningful and rule-governed in a society is determined by the
studied form of life, not by the scientific community - otherwise we
would lose altogether touch with the investigated phenomena's
character as social events of a certain form of life.6 So, any
sociologist or anthropologist must be sensitive to the studied
society's criteria of sameness and difference that are, after all,
constitutive of the phenomena under investigation.
After these preliminary remarks we are ready to tackle the main
issues of this paper from Winch's point of view. First, he holds that
since "[t]he concepts we have settle for us the form of the experience
we have of the world", "[o]ur idea of what belongs to the realm of
reality is given for us in the language that we use".7 Thus it is no
surprise that according to Winch, as science, too, is only one - and a
thoroughly respectable - way of conceptualizing reality, it cannot
claim to hold the key to reality as it is in itself. Second, since each
mode of social life has its own criteria of meaningfulness and logic,
Winch claims that we are caught in a philosophical muddle if we
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attemptto evaluate one mode of life by the criteria of another. This is
what happens when, for example, rationality of religious behavior is
evaluated in terms of the hypothetic-deductive methodology of
scientific enterprises. Both science and religion are, according to
Winch, "in itself' non-logical, that is, neither logical nor illogical;
logicality and illogicality can only be spoken of within a mode of life
and its rules.8
So, Winch thinks that each language and form of life carries its
own concept of rationality with it, "human rationality is essentially
social in character"9• He emphasizes the differences in criteria of
rationality and asks, "whose concept of rationality" in each case is in
question; ours or someone else's?10 From all this it seems to follow
that there are and can never be universal criteria of rationality: all we
ever have are alternative standards of rationality, with no external
vantage point to assess different ways of reasoning. 11 Thus we end up
with a context-dependent view of rationality: there is a plurality of
different rationalities or ways of making life intelligible, from which
we can learn new ways of coming to terms with life. 12
LUKES AND THE UNIVERSAL CRITERIA OF RATIONALITY
As is to be expected, many writers have striven to defend
universal criteria of rationality; to my mind, Steven Lukes is a fine
representative of this line of thought. 13 He accepts the view that
language dissects reality in many different ways. However, since in
order to survive all forms of life must engage in successful prediction,
they must presuppose a human-independent reality which all
humans share and of which they make predictions. Furthermore,
although "the facts" are "joint products of language and reality", in
the end the correspondence with reality is what makes beliefs true. 14
Apparently, he thinks the role of language in shaping our worldview
to be much more limited than what Winch holds; Lukes urges that
we must acknowledge that language-independent reality settles the
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standards of truth for our beliefs. If this were not so, two disastrous
consequences would, according to him, follow: first, we could not
make successful predictions, and second, without commonly shared
reality that provides us standards of truth we could not learn each
other's languages. Behind this latter claim lurks obviously the idea,
most prominently presented by Martin Hollis, that translation
presupposes a single, language-neutral world that provides us with
"simple perceptual situations" commonly identified by every human
being. These universally acknowledged percepts serve as a stable
"bridgehead" for translation, getting it going. 15 So, the first universal
criterion of rationality presented by Lukes is that a rational agent's
beliefs must correspond to the language-independent reality. \
The second universal criterion of rationality concerns the basic
rules of logic. Lukes claims that they cannot be entirely conventional:
a culture that did not operate with the laws of identity and
contradiction would be incomprehensible to us and could not "be
credited with the possibility of inferring, arguing or even thinking".
In other words, there are certain basic rules without which it is
impossible to talk of "logic" in the first place. 16
So, by the universal criteria of truth and logic, most mystical
beliefs and the illogical inferences they are based on must be
considered irrational. However, it should be noted that Lukes does
not think the idea of context-dependent criteria of rationality to be
totally misguided: because there are contextually determined criteria
of meaning, it is quite possible and often most illuminating to
evaluate alien beliefs in the context of their form of life. This is the
way their point and significance for those who hold them can be
understood, and this is, of course, of utmost importance when
conducting anthropological studies. However, Lukes maintains that
only universal criteria of rationality make justified criticism
possible. I?
Lukes' ideas are not without their merits. For example, the idea
that certain basic rules of logic could be completely conventional and
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culture-dependent strikes me as odd: if a form of life does not adhere
to them, it seems that we would hardly regard them as "thinking
logically" in any recognizable sense. However, his argument for
language-independent reality is quite problematic. To begin with, at
least to my knowledge Winch nowhere denies the existence of
human-independent reality; his point is rather the Kantian one that
we cannot know what it is "in itself', apart from our language-shaped
categories. I do not see how this would make successful prediction
impossible. Furthermore, Lukes' ideas of correspondence and
translatability seem to rest on the assumption that at least some
percepts are concept- and language-neutral, and this position has
been heavily under attack in the "post-empiricist" philosophy of
science of the last decades. The widely accepted idea that even
apparently simple observations are theory-dependent or theory-
laden casts doubts on Lukes' account: correspondence with reality
seems always to be sought from a particular conceptual standpoint
that has its effects on interpreting what we perceive. Furthermore,
Lukes' view of universal rationality matches so closely our western
scientific rationality that an air of ethnocentrism is hard to shake off.
But do these shortcomings mean that we should just accept that
there is a multitude of ways of reasoning and forming beliefs and no
legitimate grounds for evaluating them? This does not strike me as
an adequate position, and I examine lastly the approach outlined by
Charles Taylor to the problems concerning rationality and relativism.
TAYLORAND RATIONALIlY AS ARTICULATION
Taylor starts off by contending that rationality is about more
than just logical consistency. He proposes that a richer conception of
rationality is linked to articulation: "[W]e have a rational grasp of
something when we can articulate it, that means, distinguish and lay
out the different features of the matter in perspicuous order."18 The
requirement of logical consistency is a necessary condition of
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rationality, for "[n]othing is clearly articulated with contradictory
formulations".19 In modern Western societies the best articulation is
regarded to be the one made"-from the disinterested theoretical
viewpoint of our sciences, and this kind of theoretical understanding
does not find a direct counterpart in atheoretical forms of life, such
as the much-discussed Mrican Azande with their magical practices.
Consequently we are prone to judge them as less rational. This is just
what Winch opposes by claiming that it is inappropriate to evaluate
an atheoretical culture by the standards of our theoretical one.20
However, as Taylor points out, although our way of classifying
domains of life into science, art, religion, etc. differs fromj the ones
endorsed by the Azande, their category of "magic" occupies at least to
an important extent the same space as our category of "science".
Zande ~agic is not, as some have suggested, merely primitive and
failed science; nor is it purely symbolic or expressive in character,
like our singing anthems or striking the flag. 21 In other words,
despite the differences, Zande magic overlaps with our scientific
practices in that both seek to explain and predict real. events, to give
an account of how things are. Taylor adds that this makes them
incommensurable: one cannot endorse both at the same time -
which, in turn, gives rise to rivalry, that is, to questions of who is
right. And this means, against Winch, that cross-cultural evaluation
does not necessarily rest on a category mistake. But how should we
proceed with such an evaluation? Taylor's suggestion is that "given
the kind of beings we are, embodied and active in the world", that is,
beings that - irrespective of our form of life - must make our way
about in the world and deal with things in it, and "given the way that
[modern] scientific knowledge extends and supersedes our ordinary
understanding of things, it is impossible to see how it could fail to
yield further and more far-reaching recipes for action". 22 Therefore,
this superior understanding of the physical universe and the
resulting high degree of technological control command human
attention.23 In other words, valid transcultural evaluations are
possible at least in certain respects: for example, modern science is
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capable of providing such an articulation of the physical world, with a
huge pay-off in practical terms, that being the kind of creatures that
we human beings are - embodied actors in a material world - it
would be irrational not to consider modern science superior to tribal
magic or pre-Galilean Ren~issance science. For example modern
medicine has discerned th~ workings of the human body in such a
detailed manner and provided such a considerable decrease of
human suffering coupled with prolongation of life span that it surely
does seem irrational to regard it as anything but an advance in
relation to alternative activities pertaining to human health.
In a later paper, Taylor - following Alasdair Maclntyre - has
worked out these ideas from a slightly different angle. He suggests
that it is possible to rationally evaluate two essentially different
positions (for instance the Aristotelian theory of motion vs. Galilean
mechanics) without any external or ultimate criteria, if the transition
from one position to another can be convincingly presented as better
understanding of phenomena. So the evaluation of two positions or
paradigms, let's say A and B, can be based on the relationship
between them: if B can not only provide an account of the
phenomena of a certain domain but also explain "the history of [A]
and its particular pattern of anomalies, difficulties, makeshifts, and
breakdowns", it is rational to choose B over A, for in adopting B, "we
make better sense not just of the world, but of our history of trying to
explain the world".24 This, in fact, is what happened when the
Galilean worldview prevailed over the Aristotelian one; or as Taylor
puts it: "[Y]ou can move from Aristotle to Galileo realizing a gain in
understanding, but not vice versa."25 The crucial point is that
whatever is "ultimately true", we can supply rational comparative
judgments that show how an epistemic position can be improved by
moving from A to B.26 So, Taylor's point can, I think, be put as
follows. Although reality can be approached and explained in
radically differing ways, we human beings are inherently
understanding creatures, and as such we recognize when a certain
position provides a wider and more coherent framework for grasping
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the world. And although this does not give us access to a description
of the world "as it is in itself', it enables us to make justified and
rational assessments between different positions.
However, as Taylor rightly points out, we cannot say that our
form of life as a whole is superior to all others. Perhaps it would be,
all things considered, better to live like the Renaissance people: it is
by no means absurd to argue that our modern technological form of
life has dissociated us from the rest of the universe, having a negative
impact on our wisdom and resulting in an experience of emptiness
and meaninglessness of life. But even this would not refute its
scientific superiority.27
CONCLUDING REMARKS
I think that we should not rule out the possibility of finding
some hu~an constants that make certain topics or domains of reality
especially'relevant for us. Thus, I would suggest, following Taylor,
that since it is constitutive of being "human" that we are embodied
and finite beings with limited existence, our bodily well-being and
continuance of life cannot but be of crucial importance to all forms of
human existence. This is why a certain type of relation to the world -
maybe it could be called technico-practical - is necessary to all forms
of human life, and I would conjecture that they all have some
activities that overlap, at least to an important degree, with our
scientific mode of life which is strongly intertwined with this
fundamental relation to the world. This conclusion would probably
not be accepted by Winch, who claims that although there could not
be a human society that was not also a moral community, not all
human societies are scientific communities.28 Obviously he means by
this that all forms of life have an "ethical space" determined largely
by the "limiting notions" of birth, death, and sexual relations:
"[T]heir central position with a society's institutions is and must be a
constant factor",29 and, according to Winch, no corresponding
, )
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notions having to do with scientific activities can be found. However,
it should be noticed that also he at least hints to the other direction
by commenting that "[c]learly the nature of Zande life is such that it
is of very great importance to them that their crops should thrive",30
and it is hard to see why something similar would not apply to all
human life.31
Furthermore, the above-presented hermeneutic idea of human
beings as fundamentally understanding beings is, to my lights at
least, an idea worth serious consideration, for from this position it
can be claimed that when discussing those domains of life that are
important for us, we are able to recognize when a more
comprehensive and clarified position has been achieved. This, in
turn, would enable us to make comparative judgments between
differing positions, even when they diverge radically from each other.
So, since our science provides the best understanding thus far of the
physical world and its workings, it is quite rational to adopt it instead
of, say, magical rites of the Azande. To my mind, the Azande present
a relatively easy case; sometimes it is much harder to decide which
position provides the most insightful account of a given domain.
Moreover, I would emphasize the importance of being able to
distinguish when we are dealing with different domains of reality: for
example physics and sociology concern altogether different domains,
and consequently it is a category mistake to propose reducing one to
the other. But it should surely not be forgotten that all this talk about
science by no means implies that there would not be, apart from the
technical-scientific one, many other domains of life in which we have
a lot to learn from other cultures' ways of articulating them. And I
certainly think this to be so.
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LANGUAGE - A BRIDGE OR A
BARRIER? HERMENEUTI'C AND
POST-STRUCTURALIST VIEWS ON




In the so-called Gadamer-Derrida encounter that took place in
Paris in 1981, Hans-Georg Gadamer posed the following question:
"What, in the final analysis, is linguisticality? Is it a bridge or a
barrier?" (Gadamer 1989a, 27.) Much of the controversy between
Gadamer and Jacques Derrida - and the hermeneutic and post-
structuralist traditions in more general terms - pertain to their
different views on the nature of language and its implications on the
possibility of rational and ethical communication. The hermeneutic
tradition, in which Gadamer stands, emphasises the enabling
character of language, whereas the post-structuralist tradition
continues the Nietzschean legacy which lays stress on the violent
dimension inherent in all linguistic communication. This difference
underlies also the way in which Jiirgen Habermas and Derrida have
analysed September 11, for example in the interviews conducted by
Giovanna Borradori and published in her Philosophy in a Time of
Terror. Dialogues with Jiirgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida
(2003). In my paper, I would like to shed some light on the
differences underlying their statements by comparing the
hermeneutic and post-structuralist conceptions of language with
regard to the question concerning the possibility of rational and
ethical communication. Is all linguistic communication sheer use of
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